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Abstract
Political opportunity structure (POS) refers to how the larger social context, such as repression,
shapes a social movement’s chances of success. Most work on POS looks at how movements
deal with the political opportunities enabling and/or constraining them. This article looks at how
one group of social movement actors operating in a more open POS alters the POS for a different
group of actors in a more repressive environment through a chain of indirect leverage—how
United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) uses the more open POS on college campuses to
create new opportunities for workers in sweatshop factories. USAS exerts direct leverage over
college administrators through protests, pushing them to exert leverage over major apparel
companies through the licensing agreements schools have with these companies.

Key words: anti-sweatshop movement, campus activism, labor rights activism, political
opportunity structure, student activism, transnational social movements, United Students Against
Sweatshops
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Activists in the anti-sweatshop movement have faced a challenge, in that the sweatshops
workers who face the most desperate working conditions often have the least leverage to
pressure factory owners to improve working conditions. Dissident factory workers can easily be
fired and blacklisted in most countries in the Global South—and in all too many countries,
assassins and death squads are still used to repress labor activism. It is activists in the Global
North who most often have the leverage to change things. In this article, I will focus in particular
on the ways student activists on college campuses associated with United Students Against
Sweatshops (USAS) have used their greater freedom of action and greater leverage over apparel
companies to help sweatshop workers unionize and fight for improved working conditions. We
look in some degree of depth at a case where USAS members helped workers at the Kukdong
factory in Atlixco, Puebla, Mexico unionize, and more briefly at two other cases—the BJ&B
factory in Villa Altagracia, the Dominican Republic and the New Era Cap factory in Derby, New
York in the United States. There are multiple social processes that allowed USAS to support
workers at these factories unionizing. Many of them are well documented in the existing
literature—movement-building at the local level, the formation of transnational coalitions, and
using both disruptive protest and changing public discourse as sources of leverage.
While all of these factored into this case, I will highlight one process not previously well
studied, the ways in which multiple institutions—in this case colleges, the transnational apparel
firms with whom they have licensing deals, and the factories to which these lead firms
outsource—are interlocked with each other, creating a system where USAS can support factory
workers through a system of indirect leverage. Drawing on thirty in-depth interviews and a
variety of documentary evidence, I will show how USAS mobilizes their members to directly
pressure college and university administrations, demanding that they in turn put pressure on their
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licensing partners, demanding that these big apparel firms in turn put pressure on the factories
they outsource to, to recognize workers’ unions (See Figure 1). This might sound like an unlikely
chain of influence, given the geographical and social distance between students on college
campuses in the US and workers in sweatshop factories in the Global South, but in a number of
campaigns, it has been strikingly effective. The key here is that many US colleges and
universities have licensing deals with apparel companies, including some of the major players
such as Nike and Reebok, giving those companies the right to produce clothing with the school’s
name and logo on it. The big apparel firms value these licensing deals for their marketing
potential. This has allowed USAS to use these licensing deals as a source of leverage over these
firms, by successfully campaigning to get their schools’ administrations to put in place pro-labor
rights codes of conduct as part of the licensing deals. Then, if the licensees violate the codes by
using sweatshop labor, USAS can push to have the license suspended until such time as the firm
properly addresses the problem. And, while the basic model of activism was developed in
transnational campaigns, it has also been applied within the US, in particular a 2001 campaign
where USAS supported workers at the New Era Cap factory in Derby, New York.
[Figure 1 here. Caption: Figure 1: The Chain of Indirect Leverage]
This bring us to one of the central concepts in the study of social movements, political
opportunity structure (POS). This idea attempts to describe the ways in which the larger social
and political context, such as levels of repression, shapes a social movement’s chances of success
or failure (Alimi 2007; McAdam 1999; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998;
Williams 2020). Most work on POS has looked at how one group of social movement actors
deals with the political opportunities enabling and/or constraining them. In this article, I want to
look at how one group of social movement actors operating in a relatively open environment has
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sought to alter the POS for a different group of social actors in a more repressive environment.
Specifically, I will analyze how the members of USAS have used the more open POS in which
they operate on college campuses to create new opportunities for sweatshop workers in their
factories, opportunities that allowed these workers to struggle for improved working conditions
and unionize. They do so through a chain on indirect leverage—using protests like sit-ins and
hunger strikes to directly exercise leverage over college administrations, pushing them to in turn
do things that exercise leverage over the major apparel firms, who can easily exercise leverage
over the contractors they outsource to.
All this does not happen in isolation—it is interconnected with a number of other, better
researched and theorized social processes. The chain of indirect leverage is successful in part
because USAS has built ties with the sweatshop workers they seek to help in each campaign. For
this to happen, first there must be movement-building at local level (McAdam 1999; McAdam et
al. 1996; Morris 1984), both on US college campuses (Crossley 2008; Lewis, Marine, and
Kenney 2018) and in the locales where sweatshop factories are located (Anner 2011;
Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Knight and Wells 2007; Pangsapa 2007; Ross 2006). Once the local
movement-building has reached a critical mass, then it is possible to form empowering
transnational coalition (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Friedman 2009; Steffek and Hahn 2010;
Wood 2005) between groups such as USAS and labor unions representing sweatshop workers.
The pressure that USAS directly exerts over college administrations—and that workers must also
exert on sweatshop owners to be successful (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Knight and Wells
2007) (see also Marshall 2009; Waites 2019)—is done through a combination of tactics,
involving disruptive protest (Flacks 1988; Gamson 1990; McAdam 1983; Piven and Cloward
1977), changing public discourse (Ferree et al. 2002; Jasper 1997; Ryan 1991; Snow and

5

Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986), and negotiations with those in positions of authority (Andrews
2001).
Traditionally, the study of political opportunity structure has focused on movements’
interactions with nation-states (McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1998). Elizabeth A.
Armstrong and Mary Bernstein (2008), however, have pointed out that movements come into
conflict with many other social institutions besides states, something clear in the case of the antisweatshop movement’s conflicts with not only business, but the colleges and universities where
USAS operates; as a result, Armstrong and Bernstein have called for a more “multi-institutional”
approach to the study of social movements. As scholars have focused more on movements’
interactions with institutions other than states, they have begun to develop variants of the idea of
“political opportunity structure,” such as discursive or cultural opportunity structure for
understanding the mass media (Ferree et al. 2002; Wahlström and Peterson 2006), economic or
industry opportunity structure for understanding movements’ conflicts with business (Luders
2006; Schurman 2004; Soule 2009; Wahlström and Peterson 2006), or political-economic
opportunity structure for understanding movements’ actions in the context of the intersection of
state and business power (Císař and Navrátil 2017; Ergas and Clement 2016). Some of these
scholars (Soule 2009; Wahlström and Peterson 2006) have noted that these different types of
opportunity structure interact with each other, but the exact dynamics of these interactions
remain under-theorized.
What I wish to examine in more depth here is precisely how these different political
opportunity structures are interconnected—even those that are seemingly geographically and
socially distant, like US college campuses vs. sweatshop factories in the Global South—and
therefore how one set of social actors can take advantage of one set of political opportunities to
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create new opportunities for another set of social actors elsewhere. We thereby deepen our
understanding of the ways in which social movements can transform their socio-political
environment. Using the connections created by transnational apparel production chains, student
activists in the US can use their position as valued consumers to open up opportunities for
sweatshop production workers in distant geographic and social locations.

A History of the Anti-Sweatshop Movement
The dramatic worldwide rise in sweatshop working conditions is broadly linked to the
promotion of economic globalization by business and governments since the 1970s. More
specifically, it is the result of a particular strategy by companies in many industries, that of
overseas outsourcing. In outsourcing, major firms contract out important parts of production to
other, smaller firms, many of which in turn operate globally; companies based in Taiwan, South
Korea and Hong Kong may, for instance, have factories not only in Southeast Asia, but in
Central America. These contractors are then pitted against each other in a bidding war. They
each try to secure business from the major firms by offering to do the production for the lowest
possible cost, while still maintaining a certain quality. The burden for this reduction in costs is
almost inevitably shifted onto workers, producing sweatshops throughout the Global South. The
industry that in many ways pioneered this outsourcing model was the apparel business, where it
is now the norm to outsource most or all production, while the major firms focus on the more
profitable activities of design and marketing. Since the apparel industry has been the pioneer in
outsourcing and therefore in reintroducing sweatshops, it has been the main target of the antisweatshop movement (Anner 2011; Bonacich et al. 1994; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Ross
2004). Understanding this relationship between the major apparel firms and the contractors they
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outsource to is central to understanding the system of interlocking political opportunity structures
and the chain of indirect leverage. In particular, the lead apparel firms are the ones with the
power in this arrangement, with the ability to dictate not only prices, but other things—including
working conditions—to their contractors.
Another central element of this chain of indirect leverage is the fact that many US
colleges and universities have licensing agreements with such major apparel firms as Nike and
Reebok. The license allows these companies to produce clothing with the school’s name and
logo on it. The school gets a cut of the profits and the apparel companies get access to the highly
coveted student market, by means of which they hope to build up lifelong brand loyalty. Through
extended campaigns culminating in actions such as sit-ins and hunger strikes, USAS has
pressured college administrations around the US and Canada to implement pro-labor codes of
conduct for their licensees and to join the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), an independent
organization that monitors companies’ compliance with schools’ codes of conduct. Licensees
must, in turn, ensure their contractors are in compliance with the codes. When a company is
found by the WRC to be violating these codes, USAS will mobilize to pressure school
administrators to suspend the guilty company’s license until such time as the violations have
been resolved. With apparel companies seeking access to the student market and USAS chapters
at colleges around the country, this strategy has been strikingly successful in a number of
individual campaigns to help sweatshop workers in particular factories to unionize and secure
other gains.
An example of this is the 2001 campaign to support workers at the South Korean-owned
Kukdong plant in Atlixco, Puebla, Mexico, which was contracted to produce apparel for both
Nike and Reebok for export to the US. Officially, the workers belonged to a union, but it was
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what activists call a “yellow union”—one serving the interests of management, not the workers.
Specifically, it was the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (Confederacion
Revolucionario de Obreros y Campesinos or CROC), a union associated with the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI), which ruled Mexico when it
was a de facto single-party state from 1929 to 2000. Most workers were not even aware they
belonged to the union and the leaders of the union simply lined their pockets with workers’ dues.
When workers went on strike in January 2001 protesting against such things as the presence of
maggots in their food and for the right to join an independent labor union, Kukdong’s
management fired many of the workers, including the union’s leaders, and called in the police
and CROC thugs to physically attack the workers. Many workers who had not been fired had to
sign loyalty oaths to continue to work at Kukdong after the strike was repressed. However, the
workers were already in touch with US activists affiliated with USAS and other groups such as
the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center. In response to reports of the crackdown, USAS used their
leverage on college campuses to compel college administrators to threaten Nike and Reebok with
the suspension of their college licensing agreements unless they acted to improve conditions at
Kukdong. They did so and in September 2001, Kukdong’s management began to engage in good
faith collective bargaining with an independent union democratically representing Kukdong’s
workers. Kukdong—now operating under the name Mexmode—agreed to raises for the workers,
to policies preventing abusive treatment of workers by management, ands to rehire workers laid
off in the course of the labor struggle (Hermanson 2009; Knight and Wells 2007; Ross 2006;
Worker Rights Consortium 2001b).
The Kukdong case was not isolated. One can see similar patterns in other campaigns by
USAS that, for reasons of space, I will discuss more briefly—to support the workers at the BJ&B
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factory in Villa Altagracia, the Dominican Republic and the New Era Cap factory in Derby,
New York, USA. The latter is worthy of note since, although USAS developed the basic model
for their campaign relying on a chain of indirect leverage in the context of transnational
campaigns, it was equally applicable to supporting workers at a factory in the US. The BJ&B
campaign ran from 1997 (when USAS was just coming together as an organization) to 2003.
Yupoong, the South Korean company that owned the factory, was resistant to making any
meaningful changes, but eventually USAS, UNITE (the main US apparel union) and other antisweatshop groups brought enough pressure to bear on Nike that they pushed Yupoong negotiated
a contract with the workers’ union (Esbenshade 2004; Garwood 2011; Ross 2006). The New Era
Cap campaign ran from 2001 to 2002; the factory produced baseball caps for both major league
sports teams and many colleges and universities. Workers there had voted to affiliate with the
Communication Workers of America in 1997. After years of union-busting tactics and disrespect
from management, they voted to go on strike in 2001. After interviewing the workers at New Era
Cap and hearing many stories of pervasive on the job injuries like carpal tunnel syndrome, as
well as the general atmosphere of hostility towards the union, USAS members concluded New
Era Cap was a sweatshop and, with other groups such as Jobs with Justice, brought their own
pressure successfully to bear on the company (Carty 2006; Worker Rights Consortium 2001a,
2002) (Jane Howald, David Palmer; interviews by author, 2007).

Political Opportunity Structure
Despite a few important dissenting scholars, most scholars studying social movements
agree on the basic utility of the concept of political opportunity structure. Even Jeff Goodwin and
James M. Jasper (Goodwin and Jasper 2004a, 2004b; Jasper 2012), the major dissidents, agree
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that what the concept is meant to highlight—the ways in which larger social and political
conditions shape movements’ chances for success—is important to study; they are simply
skeptical that the concept of POS can be rescued from its many shortcomings. The most common
criticism (shared by many proponents of the concept) is that, in practice, POS is vaguely defined
and often becomes an all-encompassing ad hoc way of addressing all the social factors
influencing a movement (Gamson and Meyer 1996; McAdam 1996; Meyer 2004).
Doug McAdam (1996) produced a synthesis of a wide variety of models of the POS,
citing the following four factors as the crucial ones that repeatedly show up across multiple
cases:
•

“1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system

•

“2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that
typically undergird a polity

•

“3. The presence or absence of elite allies

•

“4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression” (p. 27).

Although other scholars have produced other syntheses (e.g. Gamson and Meyer 1996; Tarrow
1998), Goodwin and Jasper (2012) argue that McAdam’s synthesis is the classic one that has
defined how most scholars think about political opportunity structure.
David Meyer (2004) proposes another useful way of bringing order to these many
factors—to make a basic distinction between mobilizing opportunities and influence
opportunities. Mobilizing opportunities refer to a movement’s ability to organize independently
and expand their membership through recruitment—a basic precondition to a movement’s very
existence. Influence opportunities refer to those social mechanisms that exist for movements to
exert pressure on their targets, directly or indirectly, to alter their policies in order to accomplish
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the movement’s goals. One set of opportunities may exist without the other—for instance,
movements may be relatively free to organize but have little way to pressure authorities to
change their actions. Matthew S. Williams (2020) breaks influence opportunities down into two
further elements, structural leverage and delegitimation. Structural leverage refers to the means
activists can bring to bear to “undermine the structural sources of elites’ power” (p. 24). In a
democratic institution, this may involve electoral politics, but more often it means disrupting
business as usual through means such as boycotts or strikes in order to impose sanctions on those
in power and coerce them into changing course. Delegitimation involves media campaigns and
other such work to alter the public discourse, in such a way that the legitimacy and credibility of
those in power are undermined.
Another major criticism of how the concept of POS has been used is that it has
exclusively focused on movements’ interactions with nation-states, something that can be clearly
seen in McAdam’s synthesis above. The implicit assumption in much of this work is that nationstates are the main opponents and targets of movements. Armstrong and Bernstein (2008),
however, point to a growing body of literature that shows that movements have contentious
interactions with many other social institutions. As an example, they point to the work of Mary
Fainsod Katzenstein (1998), who documents that for many Roman Catholic feminists, their
primary target has been the Church, which they seek to reform to be more gender-egalitarian.
The anti-sweatshop’s activities analyzed in this paper provide another good example--the
movement’s main conflicts have been with apparel corporations and college administrations,
with the state remaining largely in the background. For these reasons, Armstrong and Bernstein
call for the development of a multi-institutional theory of political opportunity structure, a task
this paper seeks to contribute to.
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Tamara Kay (2005) and Hein-Anton van der Heijden (2006) both argue that the
emergence of global governance systems such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the United Nations, and the World Bank creates a distinct new type of POS, different
from ones centered around national-states. While Kay and Heijden focus on formal, recognized
global governance organizations and agreements, global production chains create informal
governance structures, in which the largest, most profitable companies are able to exercise power
over smaller businesses, particularly their contractors (Gereffi 2001; Gereffi, Humphrey, and
Sturgeon 2005; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994). Of particular relevance for this paper is the
argument Catherine S. Dolan (2004) makes that the power structures of these global production
chain play a major role in shaping the labor management strategies of the least powerful firms,
pressuring them to keep costs as low as possible and thereby fostering abusive working
conditions.
Even within a movement, different activists may have different opportunities. Frances
Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1977) emphasize that the social location of activists—such as
sweatshop workers in the Global South vs. US college students—has a significant impact on the
social context they operate in. Activists in different social locations therefore often have to deal
with very different political opportunity structures, with differing points of opening and closure.
It’s also important to recognize just how dynamic the POS can be, including in response
to the actions of the movements interacting with those very political opportunity structures. Hans
Pruijt and Conny Roggeband (2014), for instance, looks at how different movement
organizations can create openings in the POS for each other. In their case, they are looking at
how movements operating in the same national POS, but using different strategies—institutional
versus autonomous ones—can create synergistic effects that create more opportunities for both
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organizations. The case in this paper is a related but distinct phenomenon, of a movement
organization—USAS—in one local POS strategically increasing the openings for other
movement organizations—unions of sweatshop workers such as those at Kukdong, BJ&B and
New Era Cap—in a different, geographically and socially distant POS.
Jack M. Bloom (2014) highlights another form of dynamism in the POS, pointing out that
social movements are not the only social actors whose actions and strategies are constrained
and/or enabled depending on the social structure and maneuvers by other social actors. He argues
that successful movements create a more closed POS for the elites they are challenging,
narrowing the options open to these elites so they face more pressure to give into movement
demands. Strikingly, Bloom illustrates this with a case from a totalitarian polity—not a relatively
open, democratic one—that of Solidarity in Poland in the 1980s under the Marxist-Leninist
single party state system.
Frequently, as with sweatshop workers and college students, activists in the Global South
may face a much more closed POS than those in the Global North. In such cases, activists may
use their different social locations to take advantage of what Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn
Sikkink (1998) dubbed the boomerang effect. Instead of Southern activists directly pressuring
their target in a closed POS, they more form an alliance with Northern activists who may have
greater, if often indirect, leverage over the target—thus striking the target in an indirect,
roundabout way, much as a boomerang (originally an Australian Aborigine hunting weapon)
does (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Bassano 2014; Bob 2001; Dale 2008; Irvine 2013; Marshall
2009; Stewart 2004; Waites 2019). For instance, in the Kukdong campaign discussed above, the
workers at Kukdong faced a closed opportunity structure—their efforts to organize an
independent union met with swift repression and the mass firing of their leaders. USAS then
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mobilized in support of the workers in their more open environment of the college campus—and
were able to use this to pressure Nike and Reebok, who in turn pressured Kukdong’s
management to sit down and engage in good faith collective bargaining with their workers.
Sikkink (2005) later expanded on this model, arguing that transnational activists were
interacting with a multi-level POS, with the national and transnational levels interacting (see also
Alimi 2009; van der Heijden 2006). She maps out four variations, depending on the mixture of
openness and closure in the national and transnational POS, with the boomerang effect operating
when the national level is closed to local actors but the transnational one is open.

Methods and Data
My analysis draws primarily on thirty in-depth interviews, conducted between June and
October 2007, with activists in the US anti-sweatshop movement, part of a larger project on the
strategic evolution of the anti-sweatshop movement. I used the interviews to create what Robert
S. Weiss (1994) calls a panel of knowledgeable informants—people who have participated in the
events the researcher is interested in and have otherwise difficult to obtain knowledge. In this
case, that difficult to obtain knowledge was the details of how the movement made strategic
decisions, including how they evaluated the larger social environment in which they operated. I
would ask people who had participated in these events to walk me through the details of various
campaigns and meetings, asking them how they had arrived at certain strategic decisions and
how their strategies were meant to overcome the social obstacles they perceived. Since I
interviewed multiple people involved in each major event I was interested in, I was able to
triangulate between people’s memories to reconstruct a fuller picture of the process. Given that I
wanted to be able to compare the dynamics of multiple, nationwide campaigns to support
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sweatshop workers over a timespan of multiple years, in-depth interviews gave me better access
to the data that I wanted than participant observation at one campus locale over one, limited time
period would have. This was thus a historical study, attempting to reconstruct poorly
documented or undocumented events such as activist meetings in detail, while also developing
an understanding of why those involved took the actions they did.
I started with initial contacts in the leadership of the movement and from there engaged
in snowball sampling, which ultimately gave me access to a wide range of activists who had
played a leading role in the anti-sweatshop movement. I interviewed people who helped develop
the overall strategy of the movement, who campaigned to get colleges to adopt USAS’ program,
and/or who were involved with campaigns to support workers at specific factories. My
respondents included people both in such formal staff positions as USAS’ National Organizer or
the WRC’s Executive Director and those who were involved in the national movement as
volunteers based on college campuses. I interviewed fifteen people affiliated with USAS, six
with the WRC, six with an organization called SweatFree Communities (which I do not cover
here for reasons of space), and twelve with miscellaneous allied organizations such as the
apparel union UNITE HERE and the US Labor in the Americas Project (USLEAP); this may
appear to add up to well over thirty, but many of my respondents with were affiliated with
multiple anti-sweatshop organizations during their activist careers (see Figure 2). For the most
part, the interviewees allowed me to use their real names, as their activism is a matter of public
knowledge. I did a systematic, detailed coding of all interviews with the computer program
HyperResearch, using a number of themes related to strategy and political opportunity.
[Figure 2 here. Caption: Figure 2: Venn Diagram of Interviewee Organizational Affiliations and
Numbers. Additional Note: Note that this does not fully capture all overlaps in membership since
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three interviewees belonged to multiple miscellaneous organizations.]
For practical reasons of time, finances and linguistic ability, I confined this study to USbased organizations, not attempting to study the entire global network of the anti-sweatshop
movement. It is worth noting, however, that two of my interviewees were involved in the local
campaign by the CWA at the New Era Cap factory—specifically, they were Jane Howald,
president of the local, and David Palmer, a professional CWA organizer.
A secondary source of data was historical research using newspaper articles, various
groups’ reports and websites, and other such material to help me reconstruct events in more
detail. The newspapers included not only national ones available in LexisNexis, but the on-line
archives of student newspapers (which, at the time of my research, were not available through
LexisNexis), which were crucial in reconstructing USAS’ history. These sources helped me fill
in the gaps of the historical narratives that my interviewees shared and allowed me to further
triangulate between different accounts of what happened.

A Multi-Institutional, Interlocking Model of Political Opportunity Structures
In this paper, I seek to expand upon existing work on the concept of political opportunity
structure—as well as some of the critiques of it—by developing a model of the POS that is both
multi-institutional, interactive and dynamic. We have normally thought of such opportunities in a
limited fashion, as they relate to one social group, usually in some defined geographical locale,
whether that be a college campus, a sweatshop factory, or a nation-state. This is a necessary
starting point for the analysis of the POS, but I want to add more complexity to this basic
approach, looking at the way different political opportunity structures that are geographically and
socially distant can—through the agency of social movement actors—interact with each other
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and change over time as the result of strategic action by social movement organizations.
In doing so, I build on Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008) call for a multi-institutional
approach to POS, not just by looking at opportunity structures on college campuses and in global
production chains, but also in looking at how the POS in these two sets of institutions interact
with each other, such that social actors on college campuses are able to alter the POS in global
production chains. Sikkink’s (2005) model of a multi-level POS, where the openness and closure
of national vs. global structure shapes what actions movements take as they seek for and try to
leverage openings, begins to get at some of these dynamics. But the boomerang effect can only
take advantage of these different levels of the POS because the social institutions in question are
already interlocked (Stewart 2004)—because college administrations have licensing agreements
with major apparel corporations and because the students on college campuses are in some ways
the end point of global production chains, consumers—consumers the lead apparel forms
particularly value and want to market to. Therefore, in addition to speaking of a multiple levels,
corresponding to differences in scale, from the local to the national to the global (Herod 2011), I
find it fruitful to also speak of multiple, interlocking POSs.
These interlocks can allow one set of social actors to alter the opportunity structure of
another geographically and socially distant social actor, as USAS has done for sweatshop
workers. Normally, when we analyze how movement actors take advantage of what Meyer
(2004) and Williams (2020) call influence opportunities, we look at how they are able to exert
leverage on authorities within their own immediate POS. In looking at how POSs interlock, we
still need to start here—but as a way of looking at how activists are able to engage in a chain of
indirect leverage, successfully targeting geographically and socially distant authorities over
whom they do not actually have direct leverage. The boomerang effect (Armbruster-Sandoval
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2005; Bob 2001; Dale 2008; Irvine 2013; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Marshall 2009; Stewart 2004;
Waites 2019) discussed above is a classic example of this. In the case of USAS, the chain of
indirect leverage starts with them exercising direct leverage over college administrators through
protests, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and other disruptive and delegitimating protests. They are then
able to push these administrators to use the licensing agreements with major apparel firms to
exercise leverage over said firms, who in turn are pushed to exercise leverage over the
contractors they outsource to deal fairly with workers’ unions. To follow Bloom (2014), the
actions of USAS increasingly close the opportunities for those in power they are challenging,
ranging from the immediate targets of college administrators to the geographically and socially
distant targets of sweatshop owners—which in turn opens up the POS for sweatshop workers,
who face less threat of repression when they mobilize and are now dealing with owners and
managers under considerable pressure to negotiate with them.
This also complexifies our understanding of the boomerang effect, by showing that it can
pass through multiple mediating institutions to have its effect. Keck and Sikkink’s (Keck and
Sikkink 1998) classic model of the POS, and much of the work that builds on it, involves a twostep model. For instance, in one of the cases they examine, US human rights activists
successfully applied pressure to the US government, which in turn put pressure on the Argentine
military regime that ruled the country from 1976-1983 to reduce the human rights abuses they
engaged in as part of their “dirty war” against human rights activists and other dissidents.
However, as shown in Figure 1, here we are looking at a three-step process, with USAS putting
pressure on college administrators, who in turn put pressure on the lead apparel firms, who in
their turn on their contractors.
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The Interactive Nature of Political Opportunity Structures
As discussed above, Meyer (2004) breaks the political opportunity structure into two
elements—mobilizing opportunities and influence opportunities. Williams (2020) in turn breaks
down influence opportunities into those involving structural leverage and those involving
delegitimation. Doing so helps us understand both why social movement actors need to take
advantage of interlocking POSs and the precise ways in which different POSs interlock. Given
the high levels of repression they face, the mobilizing opportunities for sweatshop workers are
very limited. It is possible to organize unions of sweatshop workers, but it is very challenging
and must often be done in secrecy, especially in early stages (Anner 2011; Armbruster-Sandoval
2005). For instance, at the Camisas Modernas factory in Guatemala, a previous organizing drive
had failed because management had used intimidation tactics to deter workers from joining the
union. So in 1996, union organizers laboriously gathered the home addresses of all workers, then
visited them there in a three day blitz, signing up enough workers to require management to
legally recognize them (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). In many countries, labor organizers face
very real threats to their lives. Liana Dalton (interview, 2007), a USAS member who, through
USAS, had an internship with a labor union in the Philippines, told me that while she was there
she was involved in investigating the coverup of the murder of one labor organizer, while
accompanying another labor organizer who fully expected to assassinated, documenting his
actions and the threats against him, so there would be a record after the fact. More generally, she
described herself as “sleeping on picket lines with people who were wanted by the military and
who couldn’t go home.”
Even once sweatshop workers have found ways to organize and mobilize, they also have
very limited influence opportunities. Since the contractors doing the actual production are in a
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bidding war with each other to keep prices as low as possible, they oppose improvements in
working conditions, which typically make the costs of production go up—and thus make it likely
that the lead apparel firms that hold the lion’s share of power in the global production chains will
simply take their orders elsewhere. Thus the factory-owners are rarely in a situation to make
concessions to organized workers, since doing so means they will likely lose business, quite
possibly enough to put them out of business altogether. This was, for instance, one of the fears of
the managers at both Kukdong and BJ&B.
USAS member Molly McGrath (interview, 2007) told me of the lead apparel firms (“the
brands” as activists call them),
They've been able to just shut down a factory where a lot of people are
organizing. Brands don't own the factories but brands have a tremendous
influence over the factories that they can just take their orders out of them. There's
nothing a factory really can do. A lot of times the business relationship is so
important that a factory owner will just do whatever the brands tell them to do.
For workers to succeed, someone has to apply pressure to these lead apparel firms. And
they are generally in no position to do so themselves—they have no influence opportunities over
the big apparel companies. But US college students potentially do because of both the value the
big apparel companies place on them as a marketing audience and the licensing agreements they
have with colleges, which creates an interlock between the college as a POS and the corporation
as a POS. As a result of pressure from college administrators, Nike and Reebok, in their turn,
began applying such pressure to Kukdong’s management. More specifically, college
administrators were warning the two companies that they might face suspension of their
contracts if they did not see to it that the rights of workers at Kukdong were respected. A
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minority of college administrators, having signed up to the WRC, now felt invested in actually
seeing that their licensees followed through on their commitments. The remainder were
responding directly to pressure from student activists (Molly McGrath, Scott Nova; interviews,
2007).
The workers at Kukdong recognized that they had limited mobilizing and influence
opportunities on their own, but that outside pressure might expand their room to maneuver and
exercise pressure on the factory managers. They had been growing increasingly frustrated with
their treatment by Kukdong’s management and the CROC for some time. Their mobilization and
initial strike, however, happened shortly after they met with representatives from USAS who
were visiting Mexico and who explained how they might use their position as college students to
support the Kukdong workers. The Kukdong workers were also networked with other US
groups, such as the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, the union federation’s program to support the
efforts of workers outside the US to unionize. Throughout the lead-up to the strike, USAS
remained in contact with the leaders of the Kukdong workers and, after the worker’s struggle
began in earnest, Evelyn Zepeda, a Salvadoran-American USAS member from Pitzer College
traveled to Altixco and lived with Marcela Muñoz, one of the workers’ leaders, for the duration
of the campaign. Muñoz and other leaders of the Kukdong workers, Zepeda and other USAS
members, the Solidarity Center, and other allies from both Mexico and the US conferred with
each other in planning the workers’ strategy (Hermanson 2009; Ross 2006).
Robert J.S. Ross (2006) argues
The student movement powerfully aided the working-class self-organization and
gave the workers [at Kukdong] needed leverage by imposing codes of conduct
over licensees who use university logos as a condition of their licenses. These
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codes require, among other things, respect for associational rights. When the
workers asked for help, the students pressured both the brands and their university
administrators to influence the employers to make concessions to the unions (p.
72).
And this was not happenstance, but something that both the workers at Kukdong and the
members of USAS strategically planned together. The members of USAS had some idea of the
leverage they could potentially have—though the Kukdong campaign was when they really first
put their strategy to the test—and approached the workers at Kukdong, hoping to support them
and coordinate actions with them. USAS was quite conscious of the necessity of effective
coalition-building and maintaining strong ties with the Kukdong workers in order to effectively
coordinate this strategy, as can be seen in Zepeda’s decision to move to Atlixco for the duration
of the campaign. The Kukdong workers also understood the importance of coalition-building and
eagerly mobilized when they understood they had allies who could potentially bring significant
outside leverage to bear on management.
The managers of Kukdong gave into pressure from Nike and Reebok in stages. Initially,
in February 2001, they rehired many of the workers they had fired, including three of the five
union leaders, as well as formally recognizing the workers’ independent union. They also agreed
to allow the Worker Rights Consortium to perform inspections of the factory (Brigham 2003;
Hermanson 2009). The pressure on Kukdong’s management escalated in June 2001, when Nike
cut back significantly on the number of its orders, officially due to fluctuations in seasonal
demand. This convinced Kukdong’s management to take the steps necessary to bargain with the
workers, which—due to their relationship with the CROC—involved shutting down and opening
under the new name of Mexmode and “compensating” the CROC for “damages” (i.e., paying
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them off). As described above, in September 2001, Mexmode’s management finally agreed on a
collective bargaining agreement with the workers’ independent union (Hermanson 2009; Ross
2006).
In the New Era Cap case, CWA organizer David Palmer (interview, 2007) told me:
I remember the night that we settled the contract. Their biggest collegiate
customer was Ohio State. I got a phone call from the students at Ohio State at
10:00 at night one night—and they let me know that I had the ability to go back to
the employer that night at the bargaining table and tell them that if we didn't get
the deal done tonight, Ohio State was the next college to go off-line. It was really
a nice moment for me--you don't get many of those types of moments when you
do this work. We got the deal done that night.
We can see that in this case, the activists in the local struggle viewed the indirect leverage from
USAS as significantly strengthening their influence opportunities—and these are activists in the
US, where labor organizers do not normally need to fear for their lives or physical safety, as do
those in the Philippines described above and in many other countries in the Global South.
This chain of indirect leverage is enabled by the fact that a US college campus has much
greater mobilizing opportunities for students than a sweatshop factory does for workers.
Although students may sometimes face blowback from the administration for their actions, they
are not in danger of losing their livelihoods or lives. The presence of student publications, the
ability to hold events like teach-ins and rallies, etc. all enhance the mobilizing opportunities for
students. College administrators are expected to not only tolerate but even engage with student
activists, even when they disagree with the students’ agenda. The broad acceptance of the right
to protest and engage in other dissident activities on college campus makes it much easier for
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college students to mobilize than sweatshop workers.
The fact that they are also valued consumers that the big apparel companies seek to court
also contributes to their indirect leverage over the apparel firms. Because these companies want
access to them as a semi-captive audience on campus for their marketing and therefore want to
maintain the licensing agreements they have with colleges and universities, the companies are
susceptible to pressure in the form of threats to suspend or cancel those licensing agreements, a
form of structural leverage. Additionally, for such companies their brand is their most important
asset, the basis of their appeal to consumers (Arvidsson 2006; Korzeniewicz 1994). This makes
them very vulnerable to delegitimation through strategies such as associating their brand with
sweatshops, since if their image is damaged, the very thing that makes their products appealing
in the first place declines in value.
Student activists also potentially have many influence opportunities they can use to exert
the necessary leverage over college administrations to pull this off. As USAS member Jessica
Rutter (interview, 2007) put it,
A campus is a closed environment and it's easy to get access to the press, at least
the campus press. There's also an enclosed decision-making process. As students,
you have access to the college president, the person who makes the decisions,
something a lot of other groups don't have.
USAS used a range of tactics, including hunger strikes and sit-ins, to take advantage of
their influence opportunities to push college administrations to adopt and enforce pro-labor codes
of conduct for their licensees. USAS member Thomas Wheatley (interview, 2007) described to
me at sit-in at the University of Wisconsin, Madison in 1997—part of the first wave of sit-ins by
the nationwide network of student activists that would later become USAS, as part of the initial
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campaign for codes of conduct for licensees. Initially, the sit-in embarrassed the administration,
bringing a great deal of local media coverage, thereby delegitimating the administration.
However, given the large size of the administrative building, even a large group of students
sitting-in (Wheatley estimated that it reached one hundred at its height) could not effectively
disrupt the workings of the administration and they seemed to lack effective structural
leverage—that is, until the student activists began banging on the walls so that no one could
focus on their work. After about an hour of this, the university’s president came down to
negotiate with the students, conceding to them on the substantial majority of their demands.
In the case of the Kukdong campaign, the implicit threat of sit-ins, hunger strikes and
other such tactics was enough to move college administrators to act, since the memory of the
most recent wave of delegitimating, disruptive student activism was fresh. This set off the chain
of indirect leverage that pushed the lead firms to pressure their contractors to deal with the
problem by negotiating with their workers’ union. USAS is thus able to indirectly exercise
influence over the sweatshop factory owners in a way that is often difficult for the workers
themselves. What USAS’ actions effectively do is alter the POS for the sweatshop workers.
USAS national organizer Zack Knorr (interview, 2007) said,
For the four or five years that we're students, the place that we have the most
power is our universities. And so we should use that power as strategically as
possibly to move universities. That's why the initial focus was on university
licensing--because that's the most direct power that universities have over these
companies.
Assessing the exact financial impact of USAS’ action on these companies may well be
impossible. For one thing, USAS’ goal is not normally to actually get their schools to sever
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relations to these companies. USAS’ goal is to get the companies to change their outsourcing
practices so workers can unionize and conditions in factories otherwise improve while
maintaining colleges’ ties with these companies. As such, when a company is caught violating
workers’ rights, as happened at Kukdong, USAS demands that college administrators threaten
the company with a suspension of their contract--with an actual suspension being a last resort.
One of the reasons USAS has taken this path is their close ties with organizations representing
sweatshop workers, who generally oppose boycotts, for fear that boycotts may, instead of
improving their working conditions, permanently eliminate their jobs. (In recent years, USAS
has launched a few actual institutional boycotts, pushing school authorities to completely sever
ties with certain companies--but in these cases, the workers USAS sought to help had already
been laid off en masse, meaning there was little left to lose (Blaskey and Gasper 2012; Garwood
2011; Greenhouse 2009, 2010; MacLaren 2013).) Thus, USAS uses as leverage the threat of
financial losses rather than actual financial losses.
This, however, should not be grounds for dismissing USAS’ ability to exercise such
leverage. As McAdam (1983) has observed, the success of disruptive actions which allow
activists to exercise leverage over authorities relies as much on the social psychology of the
situation--the authorities coming to form a “crisis definition of the situation”--as on the actual
disruption itself. McAdam explains, for instance, that the sit-ins of the civil rights movement
were effective as much because of the fear they generated among the white population who
stopped going to downtown shopping centers out of uncertainty about when and where violence
might break out (as white supremacist thugs attacked the sit-inners), as the disruption caused
directly by the sit-ins and the boycott by black supporters. In the case of the anti-sweatshop
movement, it is enough that companies fear the potential loss of an important market. When
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schools first began signing onto the WRC, companies could dismiss the whole thing. Indeed, in
April 2000, Nike canceled its contracts with two schools and Nike CEO Phil Knight canceled a
major donation to a third when these colleges signed onto the WRC (Asher and Barr 2000;
Greenhouse 2000a, 2000b). By the summer of 2001 in the midst of the Kukdong campaign,
however, Nike felt compelled to be responsive to the demands of the member schools of the
WRC and apply pressure to the factory’s managers.
By exercising this chain of indirect leverage, USAS is not just changing the nature
of their own playing field—the POS—at colleges and universities. In many cases, they
have also altered the political opportunity structure in the geographically and socially
distant sweatshop factories where workers are struggling to make ends meet and to
empower themselves through organizing labor unions. Indeed, this is arguably USAS’
ultimate goal. For example, McSpedon (interview, 2007) told me, “The long-term goal
for me was to create a structure and to create systems that opened up space for workers to
organize in a way that it was closed when we started. And so then, within that, creating
the codes of conduct, creating a monitoring system, all of that was really toward that end
of workers having the power in their workplace to organize and have a voice and these
structures are just meant to facilitate and support that.”
As a result of USAS’ actions, the workers now had more mobilizing and influence
opportunities. With international attention focused on them, it was harder for factory
owners to engage in repression, which could endanger their legitimacy in the
international market, opening up more possibilities for organizing. Less repression also
means there is more room for actions like strikes, opening up influence opportunities,
particularly structural leverage. With their patron firms pressuring the contractors to
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negotiate, influence opportunities open up even further for the workers’ unions. We can
see this clearly not in the case of Kukdong, which I discussed in depth, but others such as
BJ&B and New Era Cap as well.

Discussion and Conclusion
The potential loss of valued institutional consumers via the suspension of college
licensing agreements forced major apparel companies, such as Nike and Reebok in the Kukdong
case, to apply pressure to their contractors. This in turn forces the owners and management of
these contractors to both reduce the amount of repression and intimidation they use against their
workers and to become more open, giving access to labor unions by engaging in collective
bargaining with them. Thus, because of the ties between different social institutions, the actions
student anti-sweatshop activists take on US college campuses can alter the political opportunities
for workers in factories in countries like Mexico and the Dominican Republic. The degree of
social reach USAS achieves through such a chain of indirect leverage is quite striking.
We thus see that the POS for different groups of activists interact in complex ways,
allowing activists in one geographic and social location to open opportunities for those in
another, distant geographical and social location with more limited opportunities. The students in
USAS were able to take advantage of their more open political opportunity structure to pursue a
strategy than not just helped sweatshop workers, but changed the POS within which they
operated. This gave the latter more openings to both organize and exert pressure—more
mobilizing and influence opportunities—on their employers than they would have had without
the alliance with the student group. Looking at such interaction effects gives us one way to
understand the POS in a more dynamic fashion.
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Beyond the anti-sweatshop movement, other groups are employing a similar strategy.
Perhaps the classic case is the movements on college campuses in the 1980s to push schools to
divest from companies doing business in apartheid South Africa (Martin 2011). The Coalition of
Immokalee Workers (CIW), an organization representing highly exploited tomato pickers in
Florida, and their supporters have also mobilized in part through indirect leverage to aid these
workers who labor in what are essentially sweatshops in the fields. CIW has successively
targeted big brand-name companies such as Taco Bell and Burger King who are major
purchasers of tomatoes, pressuring them to pay Florida tomato-growers more and have that
additional amount passed onto the workers in their wages. As part of this campaign, the Student/
Farmworker Alliance has pushed college administrators not to renew contracts with the targeted
brands that give them the right to set up franchises on campus until such time as they agree to the
CIW’s demands (Eyck 2008; Student/ Farmworker Alliance 2011). Drawing inspiration from the
movement to divest from apartheid South Africa, there is now an on-going movement pushing
colleges and other organizations to divest from oil and other fossil fuel companies as a means of
fighting climate change (Howard 2015; Powell 2014). All of these campaigns successfully use
the relatively open mobilizing and influence opportunities on college campuses to initiate a chain
of indirect leverage, applying pressure to college administrators to apply pressure to companies
at one or more remove from the college—and, in the case of the anti-apartheid movement,
ultimately to the South African government.
The gains made by USAS and their allies that this article looks at are localized and often
temporary. While they have been able to help workers in specific factories unionize, they have
not been able to fundamentally alter the structure of the apparel industry in a way that makes
sweatshops less likely to emerge. Many of their victories they have achieved have also proved to
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be short-term. The gains made by unions, such as better health and safety conditions or limits on
overtime, push the costs of production for that factory up—which means the factory’s owner is
less competitive in the bidding war for contracts with the lead apparel firms. This gives the
factory-owners a strong incentive to shut down their factory, then open up a new name, now
unencumbered by a union, something that happened at BJ&B in 2007 (Clean Clothes Campaign
2007; Nova 2007). USAS members are aware of these limitations on their wins and have sought
routes to significantly altering the structure of the apparel industry. The latest example of this is
their support for the 2013-2020 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, which
required the lead apparel firms to pay for upgrades to unsafe factories when their Bangladeshi
owners cannot afford it and gives local labor unions a role in monitoring and enforcing the
Accord (Brown 2015; Nova 2014; Rahman 2014). (Unfortunately, despite the Accord’s
effectiveness—or more likely because of it—opposition to it from Bangladeshi factory-owners
and the Bangladeshi government has led to the effective end of the program. Officially, it has
been taken over the Bangladeshi government, but the government has neither the staff nor the
funding to carry it out; and, given the government’s close ties to factory owners, very likely it
does not have the political will either (Bair, Anner, and Blasi Forthcoming (2020)).)
Despite the limited nature of these victories, however, they do show that it is possible for
an activist group in one geographical and social location to help allies in a different geographical
and social location to open up their local political opportunity structure, however time delimited
this change is. Future studies might study other cases to see if bringing about these changes in
distant POS is necessarily short-term or if distant allies can bring about long-term alterations in
the POS for their coalition partners.
There is also the question of how lengthy a chain of indirect leverage can grow before it
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becomes ineffective. In their classic work on the boomerang effect, Keck and Sikkink (1998)
argue that the simpler the narrative of cause-and-effect, the easier it is for bystander publics to
understand the issue and become supportive of the cause. A longer chain of indirect leverage
doesn’t necessarily mean activists’ message has to become more complex. Amanda Plumb
(interview, 2007), a USAS member at Duke University, told me, “People could understand,
‘Don’t let Duke’s name be put on this stuff [apparel made in sweatshops]’ and ‘We’re asking
Duke to set up some standards.’” As Keck and Sikkink argue, the real key in successfully
framing these issues is to identify social actors who can be held morally accountable for the issue
at hand. The way USAS frames the matter, these include not only the lead apparel firms, but the
school administrators who partner with them. The average student supporter of USAS does not
need to understand the complexities of outsourcing and how it creates downward pressure on
wages. They just need to be offended by their school’s ties to sweatshops. Nonetheless, the
longer the chain of indirect leverage grows, the more likely it is that activists’ narratives will
have to become more complex—and there may be a point where this blunts the effectiveness of
trying to exert power through a chain of indirect leverage. There is also the possibility that if the
chain of indirect leverage grows too long, the influence exerted through it may become more
diffuse and less effective.
This system of indirect leverage works because of interlocking political opportunity
structures across organizations in multiple social institutions. Activists are able to use openings
that give them access to elites and points of leverage in one social arena to generate openings
and/or points of leverage in another arena. This is possible not simply because all social
institutions in a society are in some way joined, but because the specific organizations and
institutions in question are connected at the top--the power-holders have ties with each other that
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allow them to put pressure on each other, even if they do so reluctantly and under duress from
social movements. In the case of USAS, this tie is formed by the licensing agreements between
colleges and apparel firms. This tie is also the channel for the movement’s ability to exercise
indirect leverage--the means by which they can use their relative power and freedom on college
campuses to influence the decisions by corporations in a way that benefits sweatshop workers
half a world away.
The other cases of indirect leverage such as the anti-apartheid movement, not to mention
work by other scholars showing interaction between the opportunity structures across social
institutions (Soule 2009; Wahlström and Peterson 2006), point to the likelihood that such
interlocking political opportunity structures may be more common than may be evident from
previous research. It is possible that much of the early work on political opportunity structure,
which implicitly or explicitly limited it to looking at movements’ interactions with states, in fact
obscured the complex ways in which the POS a movement faced was constituted by multiple,
interlocking social institutions, not simply state structures. Joseph Luders’ (2006) work on
economic opportunity structure, for instance, is based on an examination of the civil rights
movement--the case study where McAdam (1999) first elaborated the concept of POS in relation
to the US’ federal state structure. It seems likely that the pressures the civil rights movement
exerted on both business and government interacted in complicated ways that could be mapped
out through a multi-institutional analysis of political opportunity. The same is doubtless true of
many other movements.
Beyond a deeper understanding of political opportunity structure, this paper brings a new
dimension to our understanding of coalition-building. Much of the literature on coalitions
focuses on the difficulties of forming and maintaining coalitions between groups from very
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different backgrounds (Bandy and Smith 2005; Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001; Lichterman
1995). Other scholars look at the strategic benefits of coalitions, specifically how different
coalition members are able to take on different, complementary roles (Armbruster-Sandoval
2005; Aunio 2012; Bob 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998). My work adds another layer to
understanding the strategic reasons groups enter into coalitions—one group may have access to a
more open POS than other coalition members and use their openings as a means to leverage open
the POS of coalition partners to give those partners more room to mobilize and/or exercise
influence. Such cases are not limited only to transnational examples. Local community-labor
coalitions (Fantasia and Voss 2004; Luce 2014; Moody 1997; Wells 2009) also frequently
involve cases where labor unions ally themselves with other groups that may operate in a
different POS, including students groups (among them, USAS specifically, which has
increasingly made labor issues on college campuses one of their focuses). This may also
elucidate one of the ways conscience constituents choose which groups they work with—some
of the USAS members I quoted above cited the strategic dimensions of what they were doing as
why they chose to work on the issue of sweatshops as opposed to other social problems.
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